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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Sheryl James brought suit under Title VII, among other
things, against the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority and
James Matthew for claims arising out of the sexual harassment she
alleges to have suffered while employed at the Power Authority.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit and, after
receiving two extensions to oppose the motion, James failed to file
any opposition.  The motion to dismiss was eventually granted by
the District Court and James did not appeal.  Almost one year after
the motion was granted, James moved, under Rule 60(b), for relief
from the judgment, arguing that the District Court applied the
wrong standard in dismissing her claims.  The Court denied the
motion, in part because it found that Rule 60(b) could not serve as
a substitute for appeal from the judgment of dismissal.  James
3appeals the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion.  Because we agree
with the District Court that such a motion cannot serve to correct
legal error, at least after the time for appeal has run, we will affirm.
I.
Sheryl James was hired and began work with the Virgin
Islands Water and Power Authority (the “Power Authority”) on
March 27, 1998.  Defendant James Matthew (“Matthew”) was her
supervisor at all times relevant to this case.  James alleges that, on
or about October 1998, Matthew made sexual advances towards
her.  After she communicated to him that the advances were
unwelcome, she alleges that he retaliated by ceasing all
communications with her, verbally abusing her in the presence of
others, and tampering with her time sheets to deprive her of pay for
the full time that she worked.  She complained to the Power
Authority about this conduct on several occasions, but she asserts
that nothing was done to ameliorate the situation.  However, the
Power Authority did attempt to hold a hearing on September 6,
2000 to clarify the matter, but James apparently walked out of the
meeting because she found it unacceptable to have to discuss the
charges in Matthew’s presence.  Finally, the Power Authority
4terminated her on December 1, 2000.
James filed a complaint with the EEOC.  The EEOC was
unable to determine that a Title VII violation was conclusively
established, and sent James a right-to-sue letter.  On August 30,
2001, James commenced suit in the District Court of the Virgin
Islands against the Power Authority and Matthew (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the “Authority”) for various intentional
torts, negligence, slander, and breach of contract.  On March 4,
2002, the Authority filed a motion to dismiss the suit and, in the
alternative, a motion for summary judgment.  James received two
extensions to her time to respond to the motion because her
attorney was struck with severe health problems and a death in the
attorney’s loved-one’s family.  In both grants of extension, the
Magistrate Judge made clear that he was unwilling to extend
further the time for opposition.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge
refused to grant a third extension, the request for which was filed
one day after James’ response was due.  James moved for
reconsideration of the refusal to grant the third extension but the
Magistrate Judge reaffirmed his decision.  Finally, on February 20,
2003, the District Court granted the Authority’s motion to dismiss
1Notably, James’ non-federal claims were dismissed for lack of
supplemental jurisdiction and have been re-filed in Territorial Court.
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in its entirety, dismissing any and all Title VII claims and refusing
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the local claims.1  The
Court noted that the “plaintiff carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of unlawful sex discrimination” and
concluded that James had “not attempted to make such a showing”
and that she “not only fail[ed] to set forth facts in support of the . . .
elements of a Title VII claim, [she] fail[ed] to set forth any
allegations or claims whatsoever pursuant to Title VII.”  App. of
Appellant at 151-52.
On February 19, 2004, James filed a Rule 60(b) motion in
the District Court for relief from judgment, one day before the one-
year deadline for filing motions under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) would
have expired.  The motion requested that the dismissal of the case
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1) because it was a result of the
mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect on the part of both
sides’ attorneys and the Court for not considering the Supreme
Court’s decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002).  Alternatively, the motion sought the same relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) in the interests of justice.  The District Court denied
6the motion, noting that James failed to offer a compelling reason to
reopen the case, and suggesting that the correct avenue to challenge
the correctness of the dismiss was through appeal.  James appeals
the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion.
II.
Rule 60(b), in relevant part, reads, “[o]n motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
James contends that the District Judge failed to conduct the
required excusable neglect analysis and that the case should be
reversed and remanded on that ground.  See In re Cendant Corp.
PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that
“[o]n [a party’s] Rule 60(b) motion, the District Court should
properly have entertained an analysis of the factors [from Pioneer
Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380
(1993)] constituting ‘excusable neglect’ to determine whether [the
party] had met them.  To fail to do so is a failure on the part of the
7District Court to properly apply the law to the facts of this case and
provides grounds for reversal on the basis of abuse of discretion.”).
Undoubtably, the Court did not consider any of the Pioneer factors
in rejecting her Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  However, unlike in Cendant,
in which the district court failed to consider the factors before
finding that the neglect proffered by the movant was not excusable
(and therefore conducted an insufficient excusable neglect
analysis), here the District Court found it unnecessary to engage in
the excusable neglect analysis at all.  The District Court’s order
explaining its denial of Rule 60(b) relief suggests that the Judge
found both (1) that the error of law alleged by James was not in
fact error and (2) that the alleged neglect was not of the character
cognizable under Rule 60(b).  See App. of Appellant at 275-77.
We consider the latter reason first, as it relates to the general
propriety of the motion rather than its merits.  However, it is
necessary to parse James’ allegations of mistake or neglect before
proceeding any further in the analysis.
A.  James’ Contentions of Mistake or Neglect
James cites, as neglect or mistake, alleged errors by the
2The latter contention is, of course, irrelevant to the merits of the
Rule 60(b) motion, as consideration of that issue is the purpose of this
appeal.
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District Court, opposing counsel, and her own counsel.  With
respect to the Court, James states that it erred in not considering
Swierkiewicz and in not properly analyzing the Rule 60(b) motion.2
This “neglect” ascribed to the Court is an allegation of pure legal
error, in applying the incorrect standard to James’ pleadings.  She
also contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying James a
third extension on the time to file her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.  The “neglect” of the Magistrate Judge cannot fairly be
characterized as erroneous, as he denied the extension as an
exercise of discretion, and had previously noted (when granting the
preceding extensions) that he was unwilling to further extend the
time and that even the second extension “pushe[d] the limits.”
App. of Appellants at 42 n.1.  James concedes that the denial of the
extension and the refusal to accept the late filing were within the
Magistrate Judge’s discretion.  See, e.g., Reply Br. of Appellant at
23.
James faults opposing counsel in not citing to Swierkiewicz
in her motion to dismiss, noting that attorneys have a duty to cite
9controlling precedent, including precedent contrary to their own
arguments.  Opposing counsel’s alleged “neglect” is not actually
neglect at all, in that the correct standard was cited.  In its brief in
support of its motion to dismiss, the Authority does not cite to any
heightened pleading standard.  In fact, the brief cites the liberal
Rule 8 standard, and thus comports with Swierkiewicz, obviating
the need to actually cite the decision.  See App. of Appellant at 23.
Finally, James describes her counsel’s error as failing to
meet the deadline for filing her opposition to the motion to dismiss
and failing to apprise the District Court of Swierkiewicz.  The
failure of James’ counsel to file timely opposition to the motion to
dismiss would qualify as neglect, meriting the Pioneer analysis.
Cf. Lorenzo v. Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 27 (3d Cir. 1993) (employing
excusable neglect analysis in the context of a failure to file timely
discovery requests).  However, James does not adequately allege
counsel’s failure to file opposition as an independent ground for
relief from the failure to cite Swierkiewicz.  James’ arguments with
respect to counsel’s neglect all refer to the consequence of the
mistake as not providing the Court with the correct standard by
which to judge the motion.  However, as noted, the Authority’s
10
motion papers correctly describe the standard.  In addition, the
District Court’s denial of James’ Rule 60(b) motion makes it clear
that the Court believed that it applied the correct standard and that
it did not dismiss the case as a direct result of the lack of opposition
from James.  Therefore, it appears that James is not offering the
failure to file opposition as an independent ground to grant relief
from judgment, but rather as another reason why the Court made
an erroneous ruling.  This idea is reinforced by James’ statements
that “[s]he made a timely Motion for Relief from Order upon
learning that she had grounds,” Br. of Appellant at 17, and that
“she could not have brought the error to the court’s attention any
earlier because her counsel failed to recognize the error until
recently,” App. of Appellant at 250.  These statements clearly point
to the failure of the Court to consider Swierkiewicz as the true
error, and directly imply that counsel would not have cited that case
in her opposition to the motion to dismiss (as she was unaware of
it at that time).  Cast in that light, the failure to file opposition is
not, by itself, a stated ground for granting relief.
B.  The Significance of Legal Error Under Rule 60(b)
As noted above, James’ contention of neglect is that the
11
District Court applied the wrong standard in granting the
Authority’s motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, before addressing the
merits of this claim, we must decide whether such a contention of
legal error can support a Rule 60(b) motion.
This Court has stated that a “Rule 60(b) motion may not be
used as a substitute for an appeal, and that legal error, without more
does not warrant relief under that provision.”  United States v.
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted);
accord Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988).  
As James points out, the precise bounds of this prohibition
in the context of Rule 60(b)(1) are unclear.  In Page v. Schweiker,
786 F.2d 150, 155 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1986), this Court set forth the
positions of the other circuits on this issue: “some courts have held
that legal error without more cannot be corrected under Rule
60(b)[, o]thers have held that legal error may be characterized as
‘mistake’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), but only where the
motion is made . . . within the time allowed for appeal.”  Page, 786
F.2d at 154-55 (citations omitted).  The Court noted that these
positions were justified “under well-established principles [that]
Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal” and explained that
3James argues that she should not be penalized for failing to raise
Swierkiewicz until after time for appeal had run, because her counsel
failed to discover the case until then.  See App. of Appellant at 227-28,
248.  This actually undermines her argument, as it suggests that the
proper avenue for the relief that she seeks would be an appeal, but that
it was too late to file an appeal so she is trying to use Rule 60(b).  This
sort of behavior is precisely what the rules above attempt to curtail.
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“[w]ere the rule otherwise, the time limitations on appeal set by
Fed.R.App. P. 4(a), and on motions to alter or amend judgments
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), would be vitiated.”  Id. at 154.
However, because the Court decided Page on other grounds, it
stated that “[t]his court has yet to decide this issue, and we do not
do so now.”  Id. at 155 (footnote omitted).  James argues that Page
leaves open the possibility that legal error may be corrected under
Rule 60(b)(1).  The language in Fiorelli and Evans with respect to
legal error and Rule 60(b), however, appears to foreclose this
argument.  At most, Page could be read to allow for the possibility
that legal error could be addressed under Rule 60(b)(1) if a motion
is made before the time for appeal has run.  Here, James’ motion
was filed well after the expiration of the window for appeal, and
therefore Rule 60(b)(1) offers her no relief.3
There is absolutely no ambiguity over whether Rule 60(b)(6)
may be used to correct legal error.  This Court has unequivocally
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stated that “‘[s]ince legal error can usually be corrected on appeal,
that factor without more does not justify the granting of relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).’”  Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 728 (3d.
Cir. 2004) (quoting Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d.
908, 912 (3d Cir. 1977)); Page, 786 F.2d at 155 n.3.  Therefore,
neither Rule 60(b)(1) nor Rule 60(b)(6) can provide James the
relief that she desires.
III.
For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the District
Court that Rule 60(b) is an improper vehicle for James to present
her legal challenges to the Court’s dismissal of her claims.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the Rule
60(b) motion.
